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Abstract
Blind signature is the concept to ensure anonymity of e-coins. Untracebility and
unlinkability are two main properties of real coins and should also be mimicked
electronically. A user has to fulll above two properties of blind signature for
permission to spend an e-coin.
During the last few years, asymmetric cryptosystems based on curve based
cryptographiy have become very popular, especially for embedded applications.
Elliptic curves(EC) are a special case of hyperelliptic curves (HEC). HEC operand
size is only a fraction of the EC operand size. HEC cryptography needs a group
order of size at least  2160. In particular, for a curve of genus two eld Fq with p
 280 is needeed. Therefore, the eld arithmetic has to be performed using 80-bit
long operands. Which is much better than the RSA using 1024 bit key length. The
hyperelliptic curve is best suited for the resource constraint environments. It uses
lesser key and provides more secure transmisstion of data.
Keywords: Hyperelliptic curve cryptography, Proxy signature, Blind signature, Symmetric
key cryptography, Asymmetric cyptography.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The study of information hiding and verication is called Cryptography. It includes
the protocols, algorithms and strategies to securely and consistently prevents access
of sensitive information from unauthorised person and enable veriability of every
component in a communication.
Cryptanalysis is the study of how to circumvent the use of cryptography for
unintended recipients or called as code breaking. Cryptography and cryptanalysis
are sometimes grouped together under the umbrella coined cryptology, encompassing
the entire subject. In practice, cryptography is often used to refer the eld as
a whole, especially as an applied science. Cryptography is an interdisciplinary
subject, drawing from several elds. Before the time of computers, it was very much
related to linguistics. Nowadays the emphasis has shifted and cryptography takes
extensive use of technical areas of mathematics, those areas collectively known as
discrete mathematics. This includes topics from information theory, number theory,
statistics, computational complexity and combinatorics. This is also a branch of
engineering but an unusual one as it must deal with malevolent opposition, intelligent
and active.
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1.1 History of cryptography
Until a few decades ago, the information collected by an organization was stored on
physical les. The condentiality of the les was achieved by restricting the access
to a few authorized and trusted people in th organization, In the same way, only a
few authorized people were allowed to change the contents of les. The availability
was achieved by designating at least one person who would have access to the les
at all times.
With the advent of computers information storage are now in electronic media.
Instead of being stored on physical media, it was stored in computers. The three
security requirements, however did not change. The les stored in computers
required condentiality, integrity and availability. The implementation of these
requirements however is dierent and more challenging.
Some security mechanisms can be implemented using cryptography.
Cryptography used to refer to the science and art of transforming messages
to make them secure and protect from attacks. Although in past cryptography
referred only to the encryption and decryption of messages using secret keys,
now a days it is dened as involving three distinct mechanisms: symmetric key
cryptography and asymmetric key cryptography.
1.2 Symmetric key cryptography
An entity Alice can send a message to another entity Bob over an insecure channel
with the assumption that an adversary Eve can not understand the contents of the
message by simply eavesdropping over the channel. The original message form Alice
to Bob is called plaintext: the message that is sent through the channel is called the
ciphertext. To create the ciphertext from the plaintext, Alice uses an encryption
algorithm and a shared secret key. To create the paintext from ciphertext. Bob uses
a decryption algorithm and the same secret key. A key is a set of values(numbers)
that the encryption/decryption algorithms use for operations.
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Note that the symmetric key encryption uses a single key(the key itself may be
a set of values) for both encryption and decryption. In addition, the encryption
and decryption algorithm are inverses of each other. If P is the plaintext, C is the
ciphertext, and k is the key, the encryption algorithm Ek(x) creates the ciphertext
from the plaintext; the decryption algorithm Dk(x) creates the plaintext form the
ciphertext. It is assumed that Ek(x) and Dk(x) are inverses of each other. They
cancel the eect of each other if they are applied one after the other on the same
input. [1]
Encryption : C = Ek(P )
Decryption : P = Dk(C)
In which; Dk(Ek(x)) = Ek(Dk(x)) = x
(1.1)
The popular modern symmetric key cryptography are
1. Data Encryption Standard (DES)
2. Advanceed Encryption Standard (AES)
The following sections describe the mathematics behind the asymmetric key
cryptography.
Groups A group (G) is a set of elements with a binary operation  that satises four
properties (or axioms) [1]. A commutative group, also called an abelian group if a
group in which operator satises the four properties for group plus an extra property,
commutative. The four properties for group plus commutative are dened as follows:
 Closure: If a and b are elements of G, then c=ab is also element of G.
 Associativity: If a,b and c are elements of G, then (ab)c = a(bc)
 Commutativity: For all a and b in G, we have ab=ba.
 Existence of identity: For all a in G, there exists an element e called the
identity element such that ea=ae=a
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 Existence of inverse: For each a in G, there exists an element a', called
the inverse of a such that aa'=a'a=e
Finite Group A group is called a nite group if the set has a nite number of
elements; otherwise, it is an innite group.
Order of a Group The order of a group |G| is the number of elements in the
group.
Subgroups: A subset H of a group G is a subgroup of G if H itself is a group with
respect to the operation on G. In other words, if G=< S;  > is a group, H=< T;  >
is a group under the same operation and T is a non empty subset of S, then H is a
subgroup of H.
Cyclic subgroups: If a subgroup of a group can be generated using the power of
an element, the subgroup is called the cyclic subgroup. The term power here means
repeatedly applying the group operation to the element:
an ! a  a  a    a (ntimes)
Cyclic Groups: A cyclic group is a group that is its own cyclic subgroup.
Ring: A ring R, denoted < f:::g; ; >, is a set of elements with two binary
operations. The rst operation must satisfy all ve properties required for an abelian
group. The second operation must satisfy only the rst two. In addition, the second
operation must be distributed over the rst. A commutative ring is a ring in which
the commutative property is also satised for the second operation.
Field: A eld denoted by F=< f:::g; ; >, is a commutative ring in which the
second operation satises all ve properties dened for the rst operation except
that the identity of the rst operation has no inverse. A nite eld is a eld with
nite number of elements. In Galois eld the number of elements should be pn where
p is a prime number and n is a positive integer [1].
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1.3 Asymmetric key cryptography
The conceptual dierences between symmetric key system and asymmetric key
system are based on how these systems keep a secret. The advantages of one can
compensate for the disadvantafes of the other. In symmetric key cryptography, the
secret must be shared between two persons. In asymmetric key cryptography the
secret is personal(unshared); each person creates and keeps his or her own secret.
In a community of n people, n(n 1)
2
shared secrets are needed for asymmetric key
cryptography; only n personal secret are needed in asymmetric key cryptography.
symmetric key cryptography is based on substitution and permutation of
symbols(characters of bits), asymmetric key cryptography is based on applying
mathematical function to numbers. In symmetric key cryptography the plaintext
and ciphertext are thought of as a combination of symbols. Encryption and
decryption permute these symbols or substitute a symbol for another. In asymmetric
key cryptography the plaintext and ciphertext are numbers, encryption and
decryption are mathematical function that applied to numbers to create other
numbers.
In asymmetric key cryptography, the plaintext and ciphertext are numbers;
encryption and decryption are mathematical functions that are applied to create
other numbers.
Keys: Asymmetric key cryptography uses two separate keys: one private and
one public. If encryption and decryption are thought of as locking and unlocking
padlocks with keys, then the padlock that is locked with a public key can be unlocked
only with the corresponding private key. If Alice locks the padlock with Bob's public
key, then only Bob's private key can unlock it.
Plaintext/Ciphertext: Unlike in symmetric key cryptography, plaintext and
ciphertext are treated as integers in asymmetric key cryptography. The message
must be encoded as an integer(or set of integers) before encryption; the integer(or
set of integers) must be decoded into the message after decryption. Asymmetric
key cryptography is normally used to encrypt or decrypt small pieces of information
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such as the cipher key for ancillary goals instead of message encipherment. However,
these ancillary goals play a very important role in cryptography.
Encryption/Decryption: Encryption and decryption in asymmetric key
cryptography are mathematical functions applied over the numbers representing the
plaintext and ciphertext. The ciphertext can be thought of as C=F (Kpublic; P ); the
plaintext can be thought of as P = G(Kprivate; C). The function F is used only for
encryption; the decryption function G is used only for decryption. Next we show
that the function F needs to be a trapdoor one-way function to allow Bob to decrypt
the message but to prevent Eve form doing so.
Many algorithm has been proposed as asymmetric key cryptography. But the
following are best known for their complex mathmatics, dicult to attack and
popular.
1. RSA cryptosystem
2. Rabin cryptosystem
3. ElGamal cryptosystem
4. Elliptic Curve cryptosystem
1.4 Digital signature algorithm
A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of
a digital message or document. A valid digital signature gives a recipient reason
to believe that the message was created by a known sender, such that the sender
cannot deny having sent the message (authentication and non-repudiation) and that
the message was not altered in transit (integrity). Digital signatures are commonly
used for software distribution, nancial transactions, and in other cases where it is
important to detect forgery or tampering.
To create RSA signature keys, generate an RSA key pair containing a modulus
N that is the product of two large primes, along with integers e and d such that
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e  d  1(mod '(N)), where ' is the Euler phi-function. The signer's public key
consists of N and e, and the signer's secret key contains d.
To sign a message m, the signer computes   md(modN). To verify, the receiver
checks that e  m(modN):
To prevent attacks, one can rst apply a cryptographic hash function to the message
m and then apply the RSA algorithm described above to the result. This approach
can be proven secure in the so-called random oracle model. Most early signature
schemes were of similar type: they involve the use of a trapdoor permutation, such
as the RSA function, or in the case of the Rabin signature scheme, computing square
modulo composite n. A trapdoor permutation is a family of permutations, specied
by a parameter, that is easy to compute in the forward direction, but is dicult to
compute in the reverse direction without knowing the private key. However, for every
parameter there is a trapdoor (private key) which when known, easily decrypts the
message. Trapdoor permutations can be viewed as public-key encryption systems,
where the parameter is the public key and the trapdoor is the secret key, and where
encrypting corresponds to computing the forward direction of the permutation, while
decrypting corresponds to the reverse direction. Trapdoor permutations can also be
viewed as digital signature schemes, where computing the reverse direction with
the secret key is thought of as signing, and computing the forward direction is
done to verify signatures. Because of this correspondence, digital signatures are
often described as based on public-key cryptosystems, where signing is equivalent to
decryption and verication is equivalent to encryption, but this is not the only way
digital signatures are computed.
Usually, this type of signature scheme is vulnerable to a key-only existential
forgery attack. To create a forgery, the attacker picks a random signature  and
uses the verication procedure to determine the message M corresponding to that
signature. In practice, however, this type of signature is not used directly, but rather,
the message to be signed is rst hashed to produce a short digest that is then signed.
This forgery attack then only produces the hash function output that corresponds
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to  but not a message that leads to that value, which does not lead to an attack.
In the random oracle model, this hash-then-sign form of signature is existentially
unforgeable, even against a chosen-message attack.
Here RSA cryptosystem is used. We can use dierent other available
cryptosystems.
1.5 Proxy signature
In proxy signature scheme, an original signer delegates its signing capability to
a proxy signer, and the proxy signer creates a digital signature on behalf of the
original signer. Actually, most of the proposed proxy signature schemes are not
feasible in practice because the security of those schemes cannot be really proved
without adopting standard signature like DSA. Most of them are not strong, secure,
and unbreakable suciently against some unknown intentional attacks; in addition,
they are not base on standard signature. To conquer those disadvantages, therefore,
proxy-protected signature scheme combining standard signature DSA which is pretty
well-known by their security properties to reinforce the proxy signature. Combining
DSA, proxy signature and PKI mechanism, this work could be used in practice.
The participants are an original signer and a proxy signer. Let p be a prime
number and q be a prime division of p   1. g is an element of order q in Zp .
The tuple (p; q; g) is public and the basic protocol of this scheme uses the following
algorithms:
Key generation: The original signer selects a random number x 2 Zq as the
private key and the corresponding public key is y = gxmodp. Then, the original
signer publishes (p, q, g, y).
Proxy key generation: The original signer should do following steps:
1. Select a random number kA 2 Zq .
2. Compute rA = g
kA mod p, and sets sA = (x+ kArA)mod q.
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3. Forward (rA; sA) to the proxy signer.
On receiving the (rA; sA), the proxy signer should verify the validity by checking
equation gsA = yrA
rAmodp. The proxy signer accepts sA, if the equation holds, and
continues following steps. Moreover, the proxy key is sA.
Proxy signature: The proxy signer can sign a message m on behalf of the original
signer to create a signature S(sA;m) using the proxy key sA.
Proxy signature verication: The verication of proxy signatures is carried out
by using the implicit public key gsA = yrA
rA mod p to replace public key in the
verication process. The verication is to check if V (yrA
rA ; S(sA;m);m) =True or
false.
1.6 Blind signature
Sometimes we have a document that we want to get signed without revealing the
contents of the document to the signer. David Chaum has developed some patented
blind digital signature schemes for this purpose. The main idea is as follows:
1. Bob creates a blind message and sends to Alice.
2. Alice signs the blinded message and returned the signature on the blinded
message.
3. Bob unblinds the signature to obtain a signature on the original message.
Blind signature based on the RSA scheme: Let us briey describe a blind
digital signature scheme developed by David Chaum. Blinding can be done using
a variation of the RSA scheme. Bob selects a random number b and calculates the
blinded message B =Mbemodn where e is Alice's public key and n is the modulus
dened in RSA digital signature scheme. Here b can be called a blinding factor. Bob
sends B to Alice.
Alice signs the blinded message using the signing algorithm dened in the RSA
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digital signature Sb = B
d mod n where d is Alice's private key. Sb is the signature
on the blind version of the message. Bob simply uses the multiplicative inverse
of his random number b to remove the blind from the signature. The signature is
S = Sbb
 1 mod n. We can prove that S is the signature on the original message as
dened in the RSA digital signature scheme.
S  Sbb 1  Bdb 1  (M  be)db 1 Mdbedb 1 Mdb 1 Md
S is the signature if Bob has sent the original message to be signed by Alice.
1.7 Problem statement
Keeping the research directions in view, it has been realised that there exists enough
scope to implement hyperelliptic curve in dierent areas of cryptography. Though
hyperelliptic curve cryptography is mainly used to key exchange process, our goal is
to implement digital signature algorithm using hyperelliptic curve cryptography.
In particular, the objectives are narrowed to the use of proxy blind signature in
hyperelliptic curve cryptography. This proxy blind signature has already been
implemented using elliptic curve cryptography. From here we conceived the idea
of implementing it on hyperelliptic curve.
1.8 Thesis layout
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2: Literature review This chapter contains the abstracts of some
selected research papers in the area of hyperelliptic curve cryptography, blind
signature and proxy signature. These research papers helped us to gain knowledge
regarding the research area.
Chapter 3: Arithmatics of hyperelliptic curve In this chapter all arithmatics
are discussed which are needed for hyperelliptic. This chapter decribes about group
laws, divisor class group, ideal class group, isomorphisms and isogenies, torison
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elements and jacobians.
Chapter 4: Proxy blind signature This chapter includes the proposed scheme.
Here we have proposed a proxy blind signature. The dierent equations are also
proved when needed.
11
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Literature review
2.1 High Performance Arithmetic for special
HECC
Regarding the overall speed and power consumption, cryptographic applications in
embedded environments like PDAs or mobile communication devices can benet
from specially designed cryptosystems with xed parameters. Here ahighly
ecient algorithm is proposed by them for a hyperelliptic curve cryptosystem
(HECC) of genus 2, well suited for their proposed applications on constrained
devices. Their work presents a major improvement of HECC arithmetic for certain
non-supersingular curves. And these curves are dened over elds of characteristic
two. They optimized the group doubling operation and managed to speed up the
whole cryptosystem by approximately 27% compared to the previously known most
ecient case. Furthermore, an actual implementation of the new formulae on an
embedded processor shows its practical relevance. A scalar multiplication can be
performed in approximately 50ms on an 800MHz embedded device. [8]
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2.2 Parallel Coprocessor Design for Genus-2
HECC
Hardware accelerators are often used in cryptographic applications for speeding up
the highly arithmetic intensive public key primitives, e.g. in high-end smart cards.
The emerging and very promising public key scheme is based on HyperElliptic Curve
Cryptosystems (HECC). Their contribution appears to be the rst one to propose
architectures for the latest ndings in ecient group arithmetic on HECC. The group
operation of HECC allows parallelization at dierent levels: bit-level parallelization
and arithmetic operation level parallelization. The authors investigate the trade-os
between both parallelization options and identify the speed and time area optimized
congurations. They have found that a coprocessor using a single multiplier (D = 8)
instead of two or more is best suited. This coprocessor is able to compute group
addition and doubling in 479 and 334 clock cycles, respectively. Providing more
resources it is possible to achieve 288 and 248 clock cycles, respectively [14].
2.3 Optimal Tower Fields for HECC
Since the development of asymmetric cryptosystems based on elliptic and
hyperelliptic curves, it has been a challenging task to implement ECC and HECC
over elds of odd characteristic. With the advent of Optimal Extension Fields(OEF),
Processor Adequate Finite Fields(PAFF), and more recently OTF, the performance
of ECC and HECC over prime(extension) elds increased drastically. For a xed
security level, OTFs oer dierent eld extensions. Thus, the structure of the eld
can be varied and adapted to the processor word size which yields to an ecient eld
arithmetic. Our implementation of HECC over OTF shows the practical relevance
of OTF in cryptographic implementations. The arithmetic over OTFs allows for
a very ecient implementation. On a typical 32-bit embedded microprocessor,
namely the ARM7TDMI, a scalar multiplication for a 160-bit group order can be
13
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performed in 44.2ms. Compared to the currently fastest implementation over elds
of characteristic two, namely genus-2 HECC over GF(281) on the same processor,
this is an improvement of approximately 57%. The implementation on the Pentium
4 processor computes a scalar multiplication over a group order of 160 bit in
2.13ms [15].
2.4 Divisor Class Addition-Subtraction
Here the authors proposed ecient algorithms for the  -adic sliding window method
and applied the algorithms to Koblitz elliptic curve cryptosystem. In this paper,
authors extend their ideas to hyperelliptic curve cryptosystem. We give respectively
explicit formulae of simultaneous divisor class addition-subtraction algorithm for
genus 2 hyperelliptic curves in ane and projective coordinate system and analyze
the case of genus 3 hyperelliptic curves. Using this idea and Montgomery trick,
we can reduce the number of inversions, multiplications and squares. In addition,
they have applied the idea to speed up the precomputation part of two scalar
multiplication algorithms for hyperelliptic curve cryptosystem and discuss the
eciency of improved algorithms in detail [5].
2.5 Cantor versus Harley: Optimization and
Analysis of Explicit Formulae for HECC
Hyperelliptic curves (HEC) look promising for cryptographic applications. The
reason is their short operand size compared to other public-key schemes. The
operand sizes seem well suited for small processor architectures, where memory
and speed are constrained. However, the group operation has been believed to be
too complex and, thus, HEC have not been used in this context so far. In this
paper, the authors have tried to increase the eciency of the genus-2 and genus-3
hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems. For certain genus-3 curves, they have gained
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almost 80 percent performance for a group doubling. This work not only improves
Gaudry and Harleys algorithm, but also improves the original algorithm introduced
by Cantor. Contrary to common belief, they have shown that it is also practical
for certain curves to use Cantors algorithm to obtain the highest eciency for the
group operation. In addition, they have introduced a general reduction method for
polynomials according to Karatsuba. They have implemented most ecient group
operations on Pentium and ARM microprocessors [16].
2.6 Hyperelliptic Curve Crypto Coprocessor
This paper presents a microcode instruction set coprocessor. It is designed
to work with an 8-bit 8051 microcontroller which implements a Hyperelliptic
Curve Cryptosystem (HECC). The microcode coprocessor is performs a range
of Galois Field operations using a dual multiplier/dual adder datapath and
storing the intermediate results in the local storage unit of the coprocessor
(RAM). This coprocessor is programmed using the software routines from the 8051
microcontroller. It implements the HECC divisors doubling and addition operations.
The Jacobian scalar multiplication was computed in a 656 msec (7.87 Mcycles) at
12 MHz clock frequency.
In this paper the authors presented a microcode crypto coprocessor. It is
designed to accelerate the Hyperelliptic Curve scalar multiplication using the 8051
microcontroller. The microcode coprocessor is performing the combination of
GF(283) operations. The divisors addition and doubling operations are implemented
using software routines based on the coprocessors microcode instructions. The
scalar multiplication is developed in C and compiled into 8051 assembly instructions.
The total delay of 656 msec (7.8Mcycles) was achieved for the 83-bit HECC scalar
multiplication at 12MHz. [9]
15
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2.7 Fast explicit formulae for genus-2 HEC
In accordance with this paper, there was developed a method of arithmetic
transforms in Jacobian genus 2 HEC in projective coordinates which provides a
lower complexity if compared to the most ecient methods known thus allowing for
increase in the eciency of scalar multiplication. This modication is characterized
by:
 reduction of the number of recomputable values
 changes in the sequence of the computational steps
 using dependencies between polynomials in the resultant computation
The suggested modication of method of arithmetic transforms in Jacobian
genus 2 HEC results in 3 to 15% reduction of complexity dependant on arithmetic
operations used and curve type. Thus, applying the introduced group operation
reduces the complexity of the HECC scalar multiplication by 4% compared to the
best known formulae [17].
2.8 ID-based Blind Signature
The blind signature scheme is a protocol obtains a signature from a signer, but the
signer is unable to read the contents of the message he signs. It is very important
technologies in secure e-commerce. The bilinear pairing such as Weil or Tate
pairing on elliptic curves and hyperelliptic curves has been found various applications
in cryptography. Several ID-based cryptosystems using bilinear pairings were
presented. ID-based public key cryptosystem is a good choice for certicate-based
public key infrastructures especially when ecient key management and moderate
security are required. This paper presents a new ID-based blind signature scheme
from bilinear pairings. Also they analyzed their eciency and security. The scheme
proposed by them is more ecient than Zhang and Kim's scheme [18].
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2.9 Hybrid Security Model for E-Commerce
Channel
The prime requirements for any e-commerce or m-commerce transactions are privacy,
authentication,integrity maintenance and non-repudiation. These are the crucial
and signicant issues in recent times for trade which are transacted over the
internet through e-commerce and m-commerce channels. To overcome these issues,
various security mechanisms related to symmetric and asymmetric type have been
designed. Digital Envelope is one of the practices to attain the prime requirements in
e-commerce channels. In this paper, the authors suggest a software implementation
of a digital envelope for a secure e-commerce channel that combines the hashing
algorithm of MD5, the symmetric key algorithm of AES and the asymmetric key
algorithm of Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography (HECC). The result illustrates that
HECC is the best alternative asymmetric key technique rather than ECC and RSA
in the digital envelope hybrid cryptosystem [19].
2.10 Ring Signature Scheme Based on
Hyper-elliptic Curves
In the paper, authors have analyzed the security problems of ring signature, such as
the improper selection of private keys and the low eciency in software and hardware
application. Then they presented an improved ring signature scheme with private
key optimization based on HECC. The adaptive optimization and probabilistic
encryption of the scheme avoids the indenite security problem in ring signature and
eectively diminish the relevance of dierent signature generated by the same singer
or ring group. So the adversaries can not attack the ring signature or the signature
system with eective polynomial algorithms. The trapdoor function of public key
cryptosystem in the scheme is based on HCDLP (Hyperelliptic Curve Discrete
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Logarithm Problem), and the algorithms make full use of the superiority of HCC,
such as short key length, low system overheads etc. The optimization designing
strategy reinforces the stability and security of ring signature and also eectively
improves the eciency of group cryptosystem for engineering application [25].
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Arithmatics Of Hyperelliptic
Curve
The hyperelliptic curves, which can be seen as a generalization of elliptic curves.
In the applications, group elements must be stored and transmitted. For restricted
environments or restricted bandwidth it might be useful to use compression even
though recovering the original coordinates needs some eorts.
The main emphasis of this chapter is put on the arithmetic properties, i.e., on
algorithms to perform the group operation.
For cryptographic purposes on imaginary quadratic hyperelliptic curves given by
an equation 3.1.
C : y2 + h(x)y = f(x);
h; f 2 K[x];
deg(f) = 2g + 1;
deg(h)  g; f monic
(3.1)
This equation is hyperelliptic curve of genus g over K if no point on the curve
over the algebraic closure K of K satises both partial derivatives 2y + h = 0 and
f 0   h0y = 0:
The last condition ensures that the curve is nonsingular. The negative of a
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Figure 3.1: Hyperelliptic curve
point P = (x; y) is given by  P = (x; y   h(x)): The points xed under this
hyperelliptic involution are called Weierstra points. Elliptic curves are subsumed
under this denition as curves of genus one [4].
3.1 Group Laws for hyperelliptic curves
For elliptic curves one can take the set of points together with a point at innity
as a group. For curves of genus larger than one this is no longer possible. The
way out is to take nite sums of points as group elements and perform the addition
coecient-wise like (P +Q) (R+Q) = P +2Q+R. This would lead to an innite
group and longer representations of the group elements. The group one actually
uses is the quotient group of this group by all sums of points that lie on a function.
Before stating this as a formal denition we give a pictorial description for a
genus 2 curve over the reals given by an equation y2 = f(x) with f monic of degree
5. As for elliptic curves, f is not allowed to have multiple roots over the algebraic
closure to satisfy the condition of the denition.
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The gure 3.1 demonstrates, this one cannot continue using the
chord-and-tangent method from elliptic curves as a line intersects in 5 instead of
3 points. To build a group we take the quotient of the group of sums of points
on the curve by the subset of those sums where the points lie on a function, e.g.
R1 = (xR1; yR1) and  R1 = (xR1; yR1) lie on the curve given by x = xR1 and
hence R1  (R1) = 0. Likewise the six points P1; P2; Q1; Q2; R1; R2 on the cubic
add up to zero in the quotient group it concedered.
This way one sees that each element can be represented by at most two points
that do not have the same (x; y) coordinate. Namely, any n > 1 points give rise to a
polynomial of degree n 1. There are maxf5; 2(n 1)g{n other points of intersection.
As soon as n > 2 the inverse of this sum of points, obtained by inecting all points
at the x-axis, contains fewer points. Repeating this process gives a reduced group
element with at most 2 points. The second condition can be seen to hold as points
(x1; y1) and (x1; y1) both lie on the function x = x1. Adding two elements is done
in two steps. First the formal sum is formed and then it is reduced. In the general
case both group elements consist of 2 points given by P1 + P2 and Q1 +Q2 and the
4 points are all dierent. A function y = s(x) of degree 3 in x passes through all of
them having 2 more points of intersection with C. The two new points R1 and R2
are inected and give the result of the addition (P1 + P2) (Q1 +Q2) = R1 +R2.
As in the case of elliptic curves, one can derive the group law from this description
by making all steps explicit. If h 6= 0 there are still two points with equal x  
coordinate but the opposite of P = (x1; y1) is given by P = (x1; y1   h(x1)) [4].
3.2 Divisor class group and ideal class group
The group we described so far is called the divisorclassgroup P ic0c ofC. To formally
dene the group law we need to take into account a further point P1 called the point
at innity.
Let C be a hyperelliptic curve of genus g over K given by an equation of the
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form. The group of divisors of C of degree 0 is given by equation 3.2
Div0c = fD =
X
P2C
npP j np 2 Z; np = 0 for all most all P 2 C;X
P2C
np = 0; and such that (D) = D for all  2 Gkg
(3.2)
This latter condition means that the divisor is dened over K. This is equivalent
to n(P ) = nP for all  2 GK , the Galois group of K.
The divisor class group Pic0c of C is the quotient group of Div
0
c by the group of
principal divisors, that are divisors of degree zero resulting from functions [4].
Each divisor class can be uniquely represented by a nite sum as given in equation
3.3
rX
i=1
Pi   rP1; PiC fP1g ; r  g (3.3)
where for i 6= j we have Pi = (xi; yi) 6= (xj; yj   h(xj)) =  Pj.
The following introduces a dierent representation that is more useful for
implementations, and for which one can simply read o the eld of denition of
the group elements. The theoretical background for this alternative representation
is the fact that for hyperelliptic curves the divisor class group is isomorphic to the
ideal class group of the function eld K(C). Furthermore, the divisor class group
is isomorphic to the group of K-rational points of the Jacobian JC of C. Mumford
representation makes explicit this isomorphism and we will use the representation
as an ideal class group for the arithmetic. To x names we keep speaking of the
divisor class group and call the group elements divisor classes even when using the
notation as ideal classes.
Mumford representation
Let C be a genus g hyperelliptic curve given by C : y2 + h(x)y = f(x), where
h; f 2 K[x], deg f = 2g + 1, deg h  g. Each nontrivial divisor class over K can be
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represented via a unique pair of polynomials u(x) and v(x); u; v 2 K[x] , where
1. u is monic,
2. deg v < deg u  g;
3. u j v2 + vhf
Let D =
Pr
i=1 Pi   rP1, where Pi 6= P1; Pi 6=  Pj for i 6= j and r  g. Put
Pi = (xi; yi). Then the divisor class of D is represented by equation 3.4
u(x) =
rY
i=1
(x  xi) (3.4)
and if Pi occurs ni times then
d
dx
j 
v(x)2 + v(x)h(x)  f(x)jx=x1 = 0 for 0  j  ni   1 (3.5)
A divisor with at most g points in the support satisfying Pi 6= P1, Pi 6=  Pj
for i 6= j is called a reduced divisor. The rst part states that each class can be
represented by a reduced divisor. The second part of the theorem means that for
all points Pi = (xi; yi) occurring in D we have u(xi) = 0 and the third condition
guarantees that v(xi) = yi with appropriate multiplicity.
We denote the class represented by u(x) and v(x) by [u(x); v(x)]. To unify notation
we denote the neutral element of the group by [1,0]. There are basically two ways for
nding a K-rational divisor class. This can be done by building it from K-rational
points on the curve. For instance, choose a random x1 2 K, and try to nd y1 2 K
such that
y21 + h(x1)y1   f(x1) = 0
In odd characteristic or characteristic zero when h = 0, the problem reduces to
computing a square root when there exists one. This can be checked with the
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Legendre symbol. Already a single point gives rise to a divisor and [x   x1; y1] is
a valid representative of a divisor class D. Unless y1 = 0 (or in general ord( D)
small) the multiples [n] D will have the rst polynomial of full degree g for n  g.
For applications it suggested to implement only the most frequent cases of inputs
which implies that the rst polynomial u has to have degree g before one can start
computing scalar multiples. To build such class of full degree one takes g random
distinct points and combines them using Lagrange interpolation to the points P1 =
(x1; y1); : : : ; Pg = (xg; yg) correspond the polynomials
u (x) =
gY
i=1
(x  x1) and v (x) =
tX
i=g
Q
j 6=i(x  xj)Q
j 6=i(xi   xj)
yi (3.6)
The resulting classes are not completely random as they are built from points
dened over K while a K-rational class may also contain points dened over an
extension eld L=K of degree [L : K]  g. One chooses a random monic polynomial
u(x) 2 K[x] of degree g by randomly choosing its g free coecients. Using the
decompression techniques one tries to recover a polynomial v satisfying uv2 + vhf .
If this fails one starts a new with a dierent choice of u. The tuple [u, v] represents
a divisor class. The amount of work to nd v is equal to solving the g quadratic
equations in the rst approach. However, checking if a u belongs to a class requires
more eort. Hence, for an implementation one can trade o the generality of the
class for less work.
Using this compact description of the elements, one can transfer the group law
that was derived above as a sequence of composition and reduction to an algorithm
operating on the representing polynomials and using only polynomial arithmetic
over the eld of denition K. This algorithm was described by Cantor [CAN 1987]
for odd characteristic and by Koblitz [KOB 1989] for arbitrary elds.
Cantor's algorithm
Input: Two divisor classes D1 = [u1; v1] and D2 = [u2; v2] on the curve
C : y2 + h(x)y = f(x)
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Output: The unique reduced divisor D such that D = D1  D2 initialization
1 d1  gcd(u1; u2) [d1 = e1u1 + e2u2]
2 d gcd(d1; v1 + v2 + h) [d = c1d1 + c2(v1 + v2 + h)]
3 s1  c1e1; s2  c1e2 and s3  c2
4 u u1u2
d2
and v  s1u1v2+s2u2v1+s(v1v2+f)
d
mod u
5 Repeat
6 u' f vh v2
u
and v0  ( h  v)mod u0 .. u u0 and v  0
7 Untill deg u  g
8 make u monic
9 return [u,v]
3.3 Isomorphisms and isogenies
Some changes of variables do not fundamentally alter the hyperelliptic curve. More
precisely, let the hyperelliptic curve C=K of genus g be given by C : y2 + h(x)y =
f(x). The maps
y 7 ! u2g+1y0 + agx0g + ::: + a1x0+a0 and x 7 ! u2x0 + b with (ag; :::; a1; a0; b; u) 2
kg+2 K
are invertible and map each point of C to a point of C 0 : y02 + h(x0)y0 = f(x0),
where h, f are dened over K and can be expressed in terms of h; f; a; b; c; d and u.
Via the inverse map we associate to each point of C 0 a point of C showing that
both curves are isomorphic. These changes of variables are the only ones leaving
invariant the shape of the dening equation and, hence, they are the only admissible
isomorphisms.
Even if the curves are not isomorphic, the Jacobians of C and C' might share
some common properties. One calls JC and J
0
C isogenous if there exists a morphism
 : JC ! J 0C mapping [1, 0] to the neutral element of J 0C . One important property of
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isogenies is that for every isogeny there exists a unique isogeny  ^ : J 0C ! JC called
the dual isogeny such that
 ^   = [n] and    ^ = [n]0
where [n]0 denotes the multiplication by n map on J 0C . The degree of the isogeny
 is equal to this n. For more background on isogenies.Two curves C=K and C 0=K
are called isogenous if the corresponding Jacobian varieties JC and J
0
C are isogenous.
3.4 Torsion elements
Denition The kernel of [n] on JC is denoted by JC [n]. An element D 2 JC [n] is
called an element of n  torsion.
Let C be a hyperelliptic curve dened over K. If the characteristic of K is either
zero or prime to n then
JC [n] ' (Z=nZ)2g:
Otherwise, when char(K) = p and n = pe then
Jc[p
e] ' (Z=peZ)r
n with 0 ; for all e  1
An elliptic curve E is called supersingular if it has E[pe] ' P1, i.e. if it has
p   rank 0. A Jacobian of a curve is called supersingular if it is the product of
supersingular elliptic curves. Thus especially the p-rank of a supersingular Jacobian
variety is 0 but the converse does not have to hold. One also uses the term
supersingular curve to denote that the Jacobian of this curve is supersingular.
26
Chapter 3 Arithmatics Of Hyperelliptic Curve
3.5 Jacobian variety of elliptic curves and group
law
Assume that E is an elliptic curve with function eld K(E). Hence, Ecan be given
as plane projective cubic without singularities and with (at least) one K   rational
point P1. Clearly E1=S1 = E.
Let D 2 Pic0E be a divisor class of degree 0, D 2 D a K   rational divisor.
By the RiemannRoch theorem the space L(D + P1) has dimension 1. So there is
an eective divisor in the class of D + P1 and since this divisor has degree 1 it is
a prime divisor corresponding to a point P  E(K); and K(P ) = D. So, E(K) is
mapped bijectively to Pic0E, the preimage of a divisor class
D is the point P on E
corresponding to the uniquely determined prime divisor in the class of D + P1 with
D 2 D.
This implies that E is isomorphic to its Jacobian as projective curve. So E(K) itself
is an abelian group with the chosen point P1 as neutral element, and the addition
of two points is given by rational functions in the coordinates in the points. Hence
E is an abelian variety of dimension 1 (and vice versa) and we can apply all the
structural properties of abelian varieties discussed above to study the structure of
E(K) (in dependence of K). This and the description of the addition with respect
to carefully chosen equations for E will be among the central parts of the algorithm.
Let P = (x1; y1) and Q = (x2; y2) be two points with x1 6= x2 of the ane curve
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
The isomorphism maps them to divisor classes with representatives DP = PP1
and DQ = QP1 of degree 0. The space L(DP + DQ + P1) has dimension 1 by
RiemannRoch. Hence there exists a function passing through P and Q and having a
pole of order at most 1 in P1. Such a function is given by the line l(x; y) = yx = 0
connecting P and Q. It has
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 = y2 y1
x2 x1 and  = y1   x1
As DP + DQ + P1 = P + Q P1 has degree 1 and l 2 L(DP + DQ + P1), there
exists an eective divisor in this class that we denote by R and which is a prime
divisor. Hence, in the divisor class group we have DP + DQ = R + P1, which is
equivalent to P Q = R on E using the isomorphism from above. Choosing P 6= Q
with x1 = x2 we apply the same geometric construction and get as connecting line
the parallel to the y   axis x = x1 . Hence, the third intersection point has to be
interpreted as the point P1. This associates to each point P 2 E an inverse point
 P which has the same x  coordinate:
In the remaining case P = Q one can use the considerations above. The function
lL(2PP1) passes through P with multiplicity 2, i.e., it is the tangent line to the
curve at P . In formulas this means
 =
3x21 +2a2x1 + a4 a1y1
2y1 + a1x1 + a3
and  = y1   x1
3.6 Division polynomials
The structure of the group of n-torsion points on E. In that context we showed
that for each n there exists a polynomial  n such that the x-coordinates of n-torsion
points are the roots of  n. These polynomials are called division polynomials.
If char(K) 6= 2, put
f0(x) = 0; f1(x) = 1; f2(x) = 1;
f3 = 3x
4 + b2x
3 + 3b4x
2 + 3b6x + b8,
f4(x) = 2x
6 + b2x
5 + 5b4x
4 + 10b6x
3 + 10b8x
2 + (b2b8   b4b8)x + (b4b8   b26)
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Proxy blind signature scheme
using hyperelliptic curve
D. Chaum introduced the concept of a blind signature scheme in 1982. An user
A can obtain the signature of B by using this scheme on any given message,
without revealing any in formation about the message or its signature. Apart from
unforgeability, the scheme ensures untraceability and unlinkability. A lot of work
has been done in eld of blind signature schemes since Chaum.
For example, in production of coins, the user makes the bank blindly sign a coin
using blind signature schemes. The user is in possession of a valid coin such that the
bank itself cannot recognize nor link with the user. Whenever a user goes through a
valid branch to withdraw a coin, he needs the branch to make proxy blind signature
on behalf of the signee bank. This application leads to the need of proxy blind
signature schemes [5].
In 1996 Mambo et al [6, 7] introduced the concept of proxy signature. In this
scheme an original signer delegates his signing authority to another (proxy) signer in
such a way that the proxy signer can sign any message on behalf of the original signer
and the verier can verify and distinguish between normal (original) signature and
proxy signature. Here also elaborated the two types of scheme: proxy unprotected
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(proxy and original signer both can generate a valid proxy signature) and proxy
protected (only proxy can generate a valid proxy signature). These schemes ensures
among other things, non-repudiation and unforgeability.
Tan et al. [7] introduced a proxy blind signature scheme, which ensures security
properties of both the schemes, viz., the blind signature schemes and the proxy
signature schemes. The scheme is based on Schnorr blind signature scheme.
4.1 Proposed scheme: Proxy blind signature
In this section we have presented our proposed scheme. This scheme is based on
hyperelliptic curve cryptography and proxy blind signature.
The proposed scheme is depicted as follows
Let a hyperelliptic curve C of genus g be dened over eld Fq of nite order dened
by equation 4.1
y2 + h(x)y = f(x)mod q (4.1)
Where
h(x)is a polynamial and degree of h(x)  g
and f(x) is a monic polynamial of degree  2g + 1
The divisor D is dened as follows:
D =
X
miPi (4.2)
is a formal weighted sum of points Pi of the curve C (and the integers mi are the
wights)
A reduced divisor can be represented as a pair of polynomials fu(x); v(x)g. Reduced
divisors can be added (group addition). e.g. D3 = D1 + D2, or doubled (group
doubling), e.g. D2 = 2D1 = D1 +D1 , and hence the scalar multiplication kD = D
+: : :+ D for k times is dened. The scalar multiplication kD is the basic operation
of HECC.
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Parameter initialization
A = Sender Alice
B = Receiver Bob
P = a large prime number
q = large prime factor of (p-1)
g = an element of Zp of order q
xA = secret key of original signer A
yA = public key of A = xAD
D = Divisor
4.1.1 Proxy phase:
1. Proxy generation: The original signer A randomly chooses k 2 Zq , k 6= 1
R = kD
S = xA + k: [D]x
Yp = S:D
(4.3)
2. Proxy delivery: The original signer sends (S,R) to a proxy signer B in a
secure way. And makes YP public.
3. Proxy verication: After receiving the secret key (S,R) the proxy signer B
checks the validity of the secret key with the following equation
YP = yA + [D]x R (4.4)
Proof:
YP = S:D
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= (xA + k[D]x)D
= xAD + k[D]xD
= yA + [D]xR
If received (S,R) satises the equation 4.4 then B accepts it as valid proxy.
4.1.2 Signing phase
1. B chose random number k1 2 Zq such that k1 6= 1
compute : RB = k1D
Now B sends RB to C
2. C chooses randomly ;  2 Zq
Rc = RB k Yp
If Rc = 0 choose another set of ; 
else
ec=H(r,m)
e=ec+
C sends e to B
3. B computes S'=k1   Se
B sends S' to C
4. C computes
Sp = S
0 + 
The proxy blind signature is (m,Sp,ec)
4.1.3 Varicaion:
Recipient of the proxy blind signature computes
e=h(SpD k ecYP k M)
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Where YP is the public value.
Check e= ec
If and this statement true then tuple(m,SP ,ec) is a valid proxy signature.
4.2 Security Analysis
Hyperelliptic curve cryptography is used as the fundamental scheme for this research.
The hyperelliptic curve cryptography is more secure than elliptic curve cryptography.
It with stand many cryptographic attack. Therefore the security analysis of proxy
blind signature is described in following section.
1. A dierent equation has been used for checking of original signatures and
the proxy signatures in our proposed scheme. Thus original signature is
distinguishable from the proxy signature.
2. In our scheme to put a valid proxy signature S (in case proxy protected xB
too) is needed. With out knowing XB or S or both this is impossible to create
a valid signature. This is the reason why proxy signature cannot be forged.
Furthermore, original signer have no knowledge about xB though he creates S
in case of proxy protected scheme. Hence the proxy signer cannot deny later
that the proxy signature not created by him.
3. The public key YP has been calculated from the original signers public key
yA. Hence the original signer cannot deny his agreement later. The public key
of Proxy signer is also involved in the public key (in case proxy protected).
Therefore the proxy signer can be identied from the signature.
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Conclusion
In this thesis we have proposed the proxy blind signature basd on hyperelliptic
curve cryptography. Three phases, namely proxy phase, signing phase, varication
phase are there in our proposed scheme. In proxy phase the proxy is generated and
delivered. In signing phase the signature obtained form previous phase is used to
sign. In third phase which is called varication phase, the obtained proxy blind is
varied. All these techniques are implemented over hyperelliptic curve cryptography.
HECC uses minimum key size less than ECC. This is more suitable than ECC in
resource constraint environments.
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